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This paper investigates the impacts of national health insurance on the
labor market, by considering the case of Taiwan, which implemented
national health insurance in March 1995. Taiwan’s national health
insurance is ﬁnanced by premiums, which are proportional to an em-
ployee’s salary. These premiums may introduce distortions to the la-
bor market. Based on repeated cross-sections of individual data we
ﬁnd that, on average, private sector employees’ work hours declined
relative to their public sector counterparts, while their relative wage
rates were almost unchanged with the introduction of national health
insurance. The results suggest that neither private sector employers
nor their employees were able to shift their premium burden to each
other.
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This paper investigates the effects of national health insurance (NHI) on the labor market,
by examining the case of Taiwan. While NHI has been adopted in almost all developed
countries,1 the rapid economic growth of newly-industrialized countries, which has brought
about vast social, economic, and political changes, has led some of them to implement NHI
(e.g., South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) and certain others to seriously consider adopting
such a system (e.g., China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Vietnam).2 The introduction of NHI in newly-industrialized countries not only serves the
purpose of enhancing the quality of human resources, which is required to sustain the high
economic growth, but it is also part of the social welfare expansion driven by democratiza-
tion.3
In the literature the effects of NHI on the labor market are seldom investigated even
though NHI has become increasingly prevalent. An exception is Gruber and Hanratty
(1995), who look at the labor market effects of Canada’s introduction of NHI. Since the
ﬁnancing of the Canadian NHI did not increase the disincentive to work, it is not surprising
that Gruber and Hanratty (1995) ﬁnd that the implementation of NHI did not have any
impact on employment or wages.
For the purposes of policy evaluation in countries that have adopted an NHI system
and those that are planning to adopt one, there is much need for empirical research on the
effects of NHI. This is particularly true for Asian countries given the sparsity of relevant
studies in the context of countries outside North America and Europe. In this paper we
consider the case of Taiwan, which implemented NHI in 1995. Our empirical results should
be most useful for public policy makers in Asian newly-industrialized countries, since most
1See Cutler and Johnson (2002).
2See Gertler (1998).
3See, e.g., Wong (2003) on the case of Taiwan.
1of them are considering adopting an NHI system. The NHI program in Taiwan is ﬁnanced
by premiums and government subsidies. The ﬁnancing of Taiwan’s NHI system is much
different from that of its Canadian counterpart. The NHI premiums, which are proportional
to an employee’s salary, are likely to create disincentives to work and to employ.
To illustrate how NHI may affect the labor market, we begin our investigation by pre-
senting a simple theoretical model of the labor market. The theoretical model suggests that
while the sign of NHI’s impact on wage rates is ambiguous, NHI has a negative effect on
equilibrium work hours, because in the model the ﬁnancing of NHI is through premiums,
which are proportional to an employee’s salary.
Our theoretical analysis is followed by an empirical investigation of the impact of NHI
on individuals’ work hours and wage rates. Our empirical analysis is based on repeated
cross-sectional individual data for the years 1992–1996 from Taiwan. We examine the effect
of NHI on work hours and wage rates by computing changes in work hours and wage rates
for private sector employees relative to their public sector counterparts based on log-linear
models. Contrary to Gruber and Hanratty’s (1995) ﬁndings, our empirical results suggest
that both work hours and wage rates decreased with the introduction of NHI. These results
are consistent with our theoretical model’s predictions.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains a review of studies
on NHI’s effects in the economic literature. In Section 3, we present an overview of Taiwan’s
public health insurance programs. In Section 4, we consider a simple theoretical model in
order to obtain theoretical predictions of NHI’s impact on work hours and wage rates. We
describe our empirical strategy and data, respectively, in Sections 5 and 6. We report and
discuss our results in Section 7. Finally, we provide a conclusion in Section 8.
22 Literature Review
National health insurance has been adopted in many developed countries and newly-in-
dustrialized countries.4 Taiwan’s NHI is ﬁnanced by premiums, which are levied on an
employee and her employer, together with government subsidies. An employee’s total NHI
premium, which is proportional to an employee’s wage, is similar to a payroll tax. The effects
of Taiwan’s NHI on an employee’s labor supply behavior largely arise from its payroll-tax-
like premium. In the following paragraphs we review studies in the literature pertaining to
the labor market impacts of NHI and payroll taxes.5
NHI could affect the labor market in many ways. However, in the literature the la-
bor market effects of NHI are not thoroughly researched yet. To our knowledge, there are
only a few studies examining the cases of Taiwan (i.e., Chou and Staiger, 2001; and Mete
and Schultz, 2002) and Canada (i.e., Gruber and Hanratty, 1995). Chou and Staiger’s (2001)
study ﬁnds that the availability of subsidized health insurance through NHI discourages the
labor market participation of married women in Taiwan, where subsidized health insurance
was only available through employment before NHI’s implementation.6 The Mete-Schultz
(2002) study suggests that greater accessibility to health insurance brought about by the
introduction of NHI does not affect the labor market participation of older workers in Tai-
wan. This ﬁnding goes against the authors’ a priori suspicion that in the pre-NHI era some
older workers stayed in the labor market largely because of the need to be covered by health
insurance.
4The U.S., which does not have NHI, is a notable exception. There are studies analyzing and explaining the
absence of NHI in the U.S., e.g., Blake and Adolino (2001).
5The commencement of NHI may also have repercussions on other aspects of the economy. For example,
NHI may crowd out other items in the government budget (see Lindsay and Zycher, 1984), have a positive
effect on health outcomes (see Hanratty, 1996), encourage medical care utilization (see, e.g., Cheng and Chiang,
1997, and Chi and Hsin, 1999), dampen household savings (see Chou, Liu, and Hammitt, 2003), and change
the hospital market structure (Tsai and Li, 2002, and Chou, Liu, and Hammitt, 2004).
6Conversely, the contraction in public health insurance coverage may encourage labor market participation
by those who are likely to be affected by the contraction. See Borjas (2003).
3The case of Canada, where NHI was enacted in 1962, is examined by Gruber and Han-
ratty (1995). It is found that the implementation of NHI in Canada did not have any nega-
tive impact on work hours, wage rates, or employment. This result can be explained by the
fact that the ﬁnancing of Canada’s NHI does not give rise to any disincentives in relation
to labor supply or labor demand. In half of Canada’s provinces, NHI was partially ﬁnanced
by premiums assessed on individuals, while the remaining provinces (as well as the fed-
eral government) relied exclusively on general or earmarked tax revenues. The premiums
are analogous to lump sum taxes for moderate and upper income individuals, whose total
contributions are independent of employment or hours of work. Their premiums only vary
between individual and family coverage. Premiums are subsidized for low-income individu-
als, who typically received health insurance subsidies prior to NHI, so that there is no net
change in their incentives regarding labor supply.
Studies in the payroll taxation literature mostly focus on the incidence of the tax. Gruber
and Krueger (1991) ﬁnd that employers pass most of the payroll tax, which covers the cost of
worker’s compensation insurance, to their employees such that wages are lower and there
is little disemployment effect. In studying the case of social security payroll taxation in
Chile, Gruber (1997) ﬁnds that the incidence of a reduction in taxation is fully absorbed by
wages and there is no employment effect. By examining the effect of the U.S. unemployment
insurance taxation, whose tax rate varies across ﬁrms, Anderson and Meyer (1997, 2000)
obtain similar ﬁndings—that is, while at the aggregate level ﬁrms are able to fully shift the
cost of the tax to workers, individual ﬁrms are not able to pass on much of their payroll tax
rate in excess of the industrial average rate. By contrast, Kugler and Kugler (2003) ﬁnd that
Colombian manufacturing ﬁrms are able to shift a small part of payroll taxation7 to workers
and this has produced a disemployment effect. They attribute these ﬁndings to the weak
linkage between taxes and beneﬁts, as well as the downward rigidity caused by a minimum
7The payroll taxation is imposed to ﬁnance pensions for the old, disabled, and survivors; health beneﬁts for
sickness and maternity; work injury beneﬁts in manufacturing and commerce; family allowances and in-kind
transfers for low-income households; and training, paid vacations and mandatory bonuses.
4wage.8
To summarize, there does not exist much research on NHI’s labor market effects. While
Gruber and Hanratty’s (1995) ﬁnding provides us with some information regarding the im-
pacts of NHI under a particular ﬁnancing scheme, studying Taiwan’s case may further en-
hance our understanding of NHI’s impact because the ﬁnancing of Taiwan’s NHI, whose
premiums are proportional to an employee’s salary, is much different from that of Canada’s
NHI. Because of the differences in the ﬁnancing scheme between Taiwan’s and Canada’s
NHI, it is theoretically and practically interesting to see how NHI’s impact on wage rates
and work hours in Taiwan’s case, which is previously unexplored, differ from Gruber and
Hanratty’s (1995) ﬁndings in the case of Canada.
Moreover, the literature concerning the labor market effect of payroll taxation suggests
that payroll taxation imposed on employers to ﬁnance social programs in the U.S. is largely
shifted to employees. There are ﬁndings indicating that when the linkage between a payroll
tax and the beneﬁts that it ﬁnances is weak, employers shoulder much of the payroll tax
and there is a disemployment effect. However, there are not many studies looking at cases
where the linkage is weak, such that the relationship between the cost/beneﬁt linkage of a
payroll tax and whether or not the tax can be shifted is not yet ﬁrmly established. The case
of Taiwan provides an opportunity for us to study the effect of payroll taxation when the
cost/beneﬁt linkage is weak.9 Our study also differs from previous payroll taxation studies,
which focus on the employment and wage effects, by examining the impact on work hours
and wage rates.
8There is a related strand of research focusing on a payroll tax’s effect on workers’ choice of occupation.
Since payroll taxes are levied on employees only, an increase in payroll taxes may encourage an individual to
switch from being an employee to being self-employed. This conjecture is supported by the ﬁndings of Moore
(1983), Bruce (2000) and Stabile (2004).
9Under Taiwan’s NHI there is a weak cost/beneﬁt linkage because all covered individuals enjoy the same
medical beneﬁts.
53 NHI in Taiwan
Taiwan’s NHI was ofﬁcially inaugurated on March 1, 1995. The main objective of Taiwan’s
NHI is to provide health insurance coverage to the entire population with uniform beneﬁts.
Citizens’ participation in Taiwan’s NHI is mandatory.10 As of 1994, prior to the implemen-
tation of NHI, 57% of the population in Taiwan had health insurance under 13 public health
insurance plans, which were mostly tied to employment status. Among these public in-
surance plans, Labor Insurance (LI hereafter) and Government Employee Insurance (GEI
hereafter) covered the largest fraction of Taiwan’s population.11 They were established in
1950 and 1958, respectively, and covered 37% and 8.06% of the population, respectively, in
1994.
LI was implemented in 1950 to cover all private establishments with 5 or more employ-
ees. In addition to providing health care insurance, LI also insured against maternity, dis-
ability, injury, death, and unemployment, and provided old-age pensions. Health insurance
was a major component of LI, and was ﬁnanced by premiums levied on both employers and
employees. In 1994 the total LI premium rate for an employee was 6.3% of an employee’s
monthly salary, which was split between the employer and the employee. The employer-
paid and employee-paid premium rates were 4.9% and 1.4%, respectively. It is noted that
dependents of the insured were not covered by LI.
10In Taiwan prior to the introduction of NHI, a non-working individual did not have access to any public
health insurance scheme, except for government employees’ dependents. Under Taiwan’s NHI, a non-working
individual can be covered by NHI as a dependent of an employed family member. If a non-working individual
does not have an employed family member, he/she can request his/her local government to sponsor (i.e., pay for
the employer-paid premium) his/her coverage and he/she will pay NT$604 (around US$18) for the premium.
For a household, which is certiﬁed by the government as a low-income household, its members’ NHI premium
will be paid for by the government. Moreover, for the unemployed, if they do not have an employed family
member to sponsor their NHI coverage, its NHI premium will also be paid for by the government.
11Another important social health program was Farmers’ Health Insurance, which was established in 1985.
It covered all farmers and ﬁshermen in Taiwan. However, since the compensation scheme and labor supply
arrangements for these workers are very different from those in the manufacturing and service sectors, we
exclude them from our study.
6GEI was set up in 1958.12 Initially, only current government employees themselves were
covered. The coverage was gradually enlarged such that by 1992 dependents (i.e., spouses,
parents, and children) of government employees and retired employees were covered. The
premium rate was 9% of the monthly salary, of which 5.85% and 3.15%, respectively, were
contributed by the employer (i.e., the government) and the employee. For a dependent to be
covered, the premiums paid by both the employer and employee were 1.9%.
In the pre-NHI era, LI and GEI provided similar medical beneﬁts, e.g., outpatient visits,
inpatient care and prescription drugs. In addition to providing medical insurance, the two
public insurance plans also provided other beneﬁts, e.g., retirement pension, maternity ben-
eﬁt, injury and sickness beneﬁt, disability beneﬁt, unemployment beneﬁt, old-age beneﬁt,
and death beneﬁt. The different premium rates for the two programs mainly reﬂected dif-
ferent levels of generosity regarding these other beneﬁts. Table 1 reports the employer-paid
and employee-paid premium rates of LI and GEI.
With the introduction of NHI in Taiwan, the medical insurance components of existing
public insurance programs were supplanted. Existing programs still provide beneﬁts other
than medical insurance to the insured.
The ﬁnancing of Taiwan’s NHI takes place mainly through premiums. An employee’s
premiums are proportional to her monthly salary and are paid by both herself and her
employer. For both the public sector and private sector, the employer-paid and employee-
paid premium rates are 2.98% and 1.27%, respectively. These same premium rates (i.e.,
2.98% and 1.27%) are charged to cover each non-working dependent of an employee.13,14
12Government employees were covered by LI before GEI was implemented.
13The coverage of an employee was initially ﬁnanced solely by premiums contributed by the employee and
her employer. Starting from 2002, the government subsidized employees’ NHI coverage by contributing 10%
of the total premiums paid to the Bureau of National Health Insurance, while the total premium rate was
raised to 4.55% of an employee’s salary. In addition, part of the revenues from cigarette excise taxes, which
were introduced in 2001, is also used to ﬁnance Taiwan’s NHI.
14The NHI in Taiwan is designed to be self-sufﬁcient. According to Article 20, Chapter 3 of the National
Insurance Act, the Bureau of National Health Insurance reviews the premium rates on an actuarial basis
periodically, and adjusts the premium rates to make sure that Taiwan’s NHI is ﬁnancially sustainable.
7The NHI premium rates are displayed in Table 1.
After the implementation of NHI, the premium rates of both GEI and LI were cut to
reﬂect the fact that the medical insurance component of these insurance plans was handed
over to NHI. The employer-paid and employee-paid GEI premium rates were cut from 5.85%
to 3.09% and from 3.15% to 1.66%, respectively. The cuts in employer-paid and employee-
paid LI premium rates were from 4.90% to 4.55% and from 1.4% to 1.3%, respectively. While
the cuts in GEI and LI premium rates are different, i.e., larger for GEI than LI, employees
and employers in the two sectors are levied the same employee-paid and employer-paid
NHI premium rates (i.e., 1.27% and 2.98% of the monthly salary, respectively). Thus, for
employees and employers under GEI and LI, the implementation of NHI led to different
changes in premiums, while the beneﬁts that an employee enjoys are almost the same as
before ¡ that is, after the implementation of NHI, there is a larger increase in medical
insurance premium rates for an LI-eligible employee and her employer. The increases are
1.17% (i.e., 1.3%Å1.27%¡1.4%) and 2.63% (i.e., 4.55%Å2.98%¡4.90%). For a GEI employee,
the premium rates of medical insurance levied on her and her employer do not change much.
While the employee-paid premium rate decreased by 0.22% (i.e., 1.66%Å1.27%¡3.15%), the
employer-paid premium rate increased by 0.22% (i.e., 3.09%Å2.98%¡5.85%). The changes
in premium rates are tabulated in Table 1.
To sum up, the introduction of NHI in Taiwan has resulted in extra costs to both employ-
ees and employers in both the private sector and the public sector. The increases in costs
are much larger for both employees and employers in the private sector than those in the
public sector. In the current study, we examine these differences in terms of the increase
in medical insurance premium rates in our empirical strategy to identify the effect of NHI’s
implementation on private sector employees’ work hours and wage rates.
84 Model
To illustrate how NHI affects the labor market, we set up a simple labor market model.
We make assumptions concerning the ﬁnancing of NHI in our model according to Taiwan’s
NHI. In the model NHI is ﬁnanced by premiums, which are proportional to an employee’s
wage, and they are shared between the employer and the employee. The employer-paid and
employee-paid premium rates are respectively denoted by ¿ and ¼.
An employer’s hours of labor demand and an employee’s hours of labor supply are re-











where D denotes the number of people sponsored by the employee for NHI coverage (which
equals one plus the employee’s number of dependents), B comprises the medical beneﬁts of
coverage under NHI, ® is the employee’s subjective valuation of B, and w is the wage rate.
The way in which the insurance beneﬁt B appears in (1)–(2) reﬂects the institutional
setting of Taiwan’s NHI. The total premium for covering an employee and her dependents
equals w(¿Å¼)D, while the actual cost to NHI of providing health insurance is BD. The two
terms do not bear a direct relationship at either the national level, the individual employer
level, or the individual employee level.15
To a worker, the term ®BD represents a lump-sum transfer, which does not depend on
the actual hours of work. This may shift her labor supply curve downward if there is an
income effect. On the other hand, since ®BD represents a discrete jump in the return to
labor supply for individuals entering the labor market, the introduction of NHI may have
15Under Taiwan’s NHI the total premium collected from an employer and its employees is less than the
cost of providing health insurance to the employees. The gap is subsidized by the government. However, the
premium rates may be raised if the NHI system is expected to be ﬁnancially unsustainable under the current
rates. For a detailed description see Section 3.
9a positive effect on labor market participation. However, since we do not allow a corner
solution in our model, we are not able to consider the effect of ®BD on individuals’ labor
market participation decisions.
This NHI system is different from the institutional settings of previous studies in the lit-
erature. For example, in the scenario graphically analyzed by Summers (1989) and the case
investigated by Gruber and Krueger (1991), the costs of workers’ compensation insurance
are proportional to the beneﬁts that its workers enjoy. It is also true for the unemployment
insurance program of the U.S., as examined by Anderson and Meyer (1997, 2000), and the
Canadian NHI, as studied by Gruber and Hanratty (1995). The cost of the insurance pro-
viding insurance beneﬁt B is C, while an employee’s valuation of the insurance is ®B.16 In
the case of Columbia’s social security system as studied by Gruber (1997), the cost borne
by an employer and the valuation of the beneﬁt by an employee are proportional, and these
two terms are also proportional to the employee’s wage, i.e., B Æ E£r, where r is the social
security payroll tax rate and E is the employee’s total wage.
In the studies mentioned above, beneﬁts do not extend to an employee’s dependents.
Because of this, the number of an employee’s dependents does not appear in the models.
By imposing equilibrium condition HD Æ HS Æ H and totally differentiating (1) and (2), we
obtain:
dH Æ f1(1Å¿D)dwÅ f1wDd¿Å f1w¿dD, (5)
dH Æ g1(1¡¼D)dw¡ g1wDd¼¡ g1w¼dDÅ g1®BdD; (6)
16Their models are speciﬁed as
HD Æ f(wÅC), (3)
HS Æ g(wÅ®B), (4)










































where f1 Æ @f
@w Ç0, and g1 Æ @g
@w È0.



























@¿ are opposite in sign, the impact of NHI on the wage rates is ambiguous.
Whether NHI has a positive or negative effect on the wage rates depends on the relative
magnitudes of the slopes of the labor demand curve f1 and supply curve g1, and the relative
magnitudes of ¿ and ¼. On the contrary, the impact of NHI on work hours is unambiguous.
Since both @H
@¼ and @H
@¿ are negative, the impact of NHI on work hours is unequivocally
negative.
These theoretical results are not surprising. The imposition of NHI premiums, which
are proportional to an employee’s salary, creates disincentives to work and disincentives
to employ. This is equivalent to a leftward shift for both the labor demand curve and labor
supply curve simultaneously. While equilibrium hours will decrease, the change in the equi-
librium wage rate depends on the relative magnitude of the shifts in the demand curve and
supply curve (which are determined by ¼ and ¿) and the relative gradients of the demand
and supply curves (i.e., f1 and g1, respectively).
11We see from (8)–(11) that the effects of NHI premium rates {¼,¿} are functions of the
number of people that an employee sponsors, i.e., D. However, since (8)–(11) are nonlinear
functions of D, the number of dependents has an equivocal impact on NHI’s premium effect
on the equilibrium wage rate and work hours.
5 Empirical Strategy
Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences and Ratio-of-Ratios with Log-Linear Models
This paper aims to assess the impact of NHI on the labor market, i.e., the equilibrium
work hours and wage rates. To illustrate our empirical strategy, we start with a simple
model. We assume that the labor market outcome L (i.e., work hours or wage rate) of an










where P1, P0, and N are binary indicators with P1 Æ 1 indicating that a worker belongs
to the private sector and P0 Æ 1 indicating the public sector; N Æ 1 reﬂects the post-NHI
period and N Æ 0 is the pre-NHI period; Lsn is an employment outcome, for private (s Æ 1)
or public (s Æ 0) sector employees, before (n Æ 0) or after (n Æ 1) the enactment of the NHI;
and we suppress the individual index i for compactness of notation. It is noted that a given
employee in our sample cannot be observed in both periods, i.e., before the introduction of
NHI and after, or be employed in both the public and private sectors. Thus, among the four
terms {L11,L10,L01,L00}, only one is actually observed and the rest are counterfactuals.
Equation (12) reﬂects the fact that our sample consists of only public sector and private
sector employees. Excluded from our sample are employees in the agricultural and ﬁshery
sector, the self-employed, employers, and the labor market’s non-participants, for whom
P0 Æ0 and P1 Æ0. This exclusion of individuals in sectors other than the private and public
12sectors may lead to parameter estimates with selection bias. We explain below how sample
selectivity is dealt with further.






where fsn(¢) is a deterministic function of x, x is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics
(which includes a constant term) and the previous period business cycle indicators, and ²s
is an unobservable random variable. This allows work hours and wage rates of private
sector employees to be determined differently from those of their public sector counterparts.
Implicit in this speciﬁcation is an assumption that the distribution of the unobservable
heterogeneity factor for employees in a given sector (i.e., ²s) does not change over time.17
We allow this unobservable heterogeneity factor to be different across sectors.
After taking the log of L and denoting `Ælog(L), we have
` Æ (N ¢P1)¢ f`11(x)Å(1¡N)¢P1¢ f`10(x)ÅN ¢P0¢ f`01(x)Å(1¡N)¢P0¢ f`00(x)
ÅP1¢²`1ÅP0¢²`0. (14)
Substituting P1 Æ(P0ÅP1)¢P1 and P0 Æ(P0ÅP1)¢(1¡P1) into (14) we have
` Æ (P1ÅP0)¢
n
(N ¢P1)¢ f`11(x)Å(1¡N)¢P1¢ f`10(x)




Æ (P1ÅP0)¢ f`00(x)ÅP1¢[f`10(x)¡ f`00(x)]Å(P1ÅP0)¢N ¢[f`01(x)¡ f`00(x)]
ÅP1¢N ¢{[f`11(x)¡ f`10(x)]¡[f`01(x)¡ f`00(x)]}Å²`, (16)
where we deﬁne ²` Æ P1²`1ÅP0²`0.
17In our empirical analysis, we have experimented with allowing the distribution of ²s to vary between the
pre-NHI periods and the post-NHI periods for a given sector. However, our statistical testing suggests that
such a speciﬁcation is over-speciﬁed. Details of the tests and the testing results are available upon request.
13By parameterizing f`sn(x) to be a linear function of x and adding subscripts i and t,








What differentiates our speciﬁcation from those in the literature is the fact that we allow the
vectors of parameters {¯`0,¯`1,¯`2,¯`12} in (17) to be different. In conventional difference-
in-difference analyses in the literature, only the coefﬁcients for the constant term in ¯`1,
¯`2, and ¯`3 are allowed to vary. To check whether our speciﬁcation is superﬂuous or not, in
the empirical analysis we test speciﬁcation (17) against a restricted version where only the
constant term is allowed to be different across regimes, i.e.,
`it Æ (P1itÅP0it)¢¯0
`0xitÅP1it¢¯`10Å(P1itÅP0it)¢Nt¢¯`20ÅP1it¢Nt¢¯`12Å²`it, (19)
where {¯`10, ¯`20, ¯`12} are scalar parameters.
Based on the parameter estimates of the regression model (17), we can compute two
measures of the effects of NHI, namely, the difference-in-differences and ratio-of-ratios (see
Mullahy, 1999). In the context of our study, the difference-in-differences gauges the changes
in the levels of wage rates or work hours. For employee i, the difference-in-differences,















Utilizing the parameter estimates b ¯`, we can construct estimates of the difference-in-
14differences and ratio-of-ratios, i.e.,
b ¢Li Æ
h































































²`s stands for the variance of ²`its. We summarize the sample information in b ¢Li
and b ¦Li by replacing xit with the sample average x pertaining to private sector and public
sector employees, yielding e ¢L and e ¦L, respectively.
A test of the effect of NHI on the level of labor market outcome L at the sample means
is based on the following hypotheses:
H¢
L0 : e ¢L Æ0,
H¢
L1 : e ¢L Ç0; L Æ H,W.
(25)














where ­¯` stands for the covariance matrix of ¯`. The above test statistic is derived using
the Delta method and is distributed as Â2
1.
In the context of the current study, e ¦L is interpreted as the estimate of NHI’s impact on
the relative growth rate of wage rates and work hours between private sector employees and
public sector employees at the sample means. If e ¦W Æ 1 (or e ¦H=1), then we will conclude
that NHI has no effect on the growth rates of the private sector employees’ wage rates (or
work hours) relative to those of the public sector employees. On the contrary, if we ﬁnd
15e ¦L Ç 1, then the empirical results suggest that NHI has a negative impact on the private
sector employees’ relative growth rate of L; and if we ﬁnd e ¦L È1, then the effect is positive.18
We test the following hypotheses:
H¦
L0 : e ¦L¡1Æ0,
H¦
L1 : e ¦L¡1Ç0.
(27)
The derivation of the associated test statistic, denoted by ¿¦





In equation (16), the identiﬁcation of NHI’s impact on work hours and wage rates hinges












Condition (28) implies that cov(P1it,²`1itjxit) Æ 0 and cov(P0it,²`0itjxit) Æ 0. These expres-
sions imply that we observe all determinants which affect an individual’s sectoral choice,
i.e., sectoral choice is assumed to be exogenous in the work hours and wage rate models.
However, this assumption is dubious since it is very possible that we do not observe all fac-
tors which determine an individual’s labor market participation decision and her choice of
sectors. Examples of such unobservable factors are an individual’s degree of risk aversion
and her ability. If an individual has a higher degree of risk aversion, then she may prefer to
work in the public sector, where income is less volatile. Moreover, an individual with better
ability may prefer to be a business owner.
In light of the above discussion, we allow that cov(P1,²1) 6Æ 0 and cov(P0,²0) 6Æ 0, i.e.,
P1 and P0 are endogenous.19 The approach that we adopt is similar to that of Vella and
Verbeek (1999). To proceed with the identiﬁcation of the effect by NHI, we specify a model
18It is obvious from (24) that ¦L is always positive.
19Endogeneity of P1 and P0 implies that private/public sectoral differences in work hours and the wage rate
are endogenous and there exists sample selectivity.
16of sectoral choice. Let us denote the latent determinant of sectoral choice for individual i
at time t by S¤
sit, where s Æ 0,1,2 is the index for the public sector, the private sector, and
the other sectors (i.e., the agricultural and ﬁshery sector, the self-employed, employers, and
labor market non-participants), respectively. Sector s is chosen by individual i if
S¤
sit È S¤
kit, k 6Æ s.
Determinant S¤
sit is unobserved and is speciﬁed as a function of demographic characteristics




where ®s is a vector of parameters pertaining to sector s, and ®2 (that for the sectors other
than the private and public sectors) is normalized such that ®2 Æ 0.20 Assuming that usi
is a mean-zero, independent, identically and standard extreme value distributed random
variable, with variance ¾2
su Æ ¼2
6 , we have a multinomial logit model for sectoral choice.21
By denoting the standard extreme value cumulative distribution function and the in-









where ¾`²s and ¾su, respectively, are the standard errors of ²`sit and usit, ½`s is the corre-
lation coefﬁcient of ²`s and J(usit), ´`sit is normally distributed and cov(J(usit),´`sit) Æ 0.
This speciﬁcation follows Lee (1982, 1983). The purpose of this speciﬁcation for the struc-
ture of the random variable ²`sit is to allow for there to be correlation between ²`sit and usit.
If ½`s 6Æ0, then there is a correlation between the two random variables.
With the speciﬁcation of the relationship between ²`sit and usit, we can address the
endogeneity of P0it and P1it. More speciﬁcally, by taking the expectation of P1it²`1it and
20Since our data do not comprise variables which are correlated with sectoral choice, but uncorrelated with
work hours and the wage rate, zit consists of xit and second-order interaction terms among individual vari-
ables in xit. The inclusion of second-order interaction terms follows Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
21Normality for usi, which results in a multinomial probit model, can also be assumed. We do not employ a
multinomial probit model for sectoral choice, because it involves a high computation cost, which is especially
daunting in our case given the size of our sample.





























where µ`s ´ ½`s
¾`²s
¾su . See Lee (1982, 1983) and Vella and Verbeek (1999) for the derivation.
Plugging (30), (31), and (32) into equation (18) yields
`it Æ¯0
`witÅP0it(µ`0¸0itÅv`0it)ÅP1it(µ`1¸1itÅv`1it), (33)
where v`sit is a residual and v`sit Æµ`sJ(us)¡µ`s¸sitÅ´`s. The variable ¸sit is an endogene-
ity correction term.
Our estimation of the parameters in (33) is conducted via a two-stage method. In the ﬁrst








is constructed by ﬁrst obtaining parameter estimates {b ®0, b ®1} of
the sectoral choice parameters {®0,®1} by means of estimating the multinomial logit model
described in (29). In the second stage we plug b ¸sit into (33), i.e.,
`it Æ¯0
`witÅP0it(µ`0b ¸0itÅv`0it)ÅP1it(µ`1b ¸1itÅv`1it), (34)
and the parameter estimates {b ¯`,b µ`0,b µ`1} are obtained by estimating model (34) with an
ordinary linear regression. It is noted that we adjust the standard errors of coefﬁcient
estimates pertaining to (34) to account for the fact that b ¸sit is a generated regressor.
The difference-in-difference estimator is adjusted as follows.















































18The variable b ¦Li associated with the ratio-of-ratios test is not affected by allowing for endo-
geneity.
Some Caveats
A potential weakness of our empirical strategy is that, in order to account for the endo-
geneity of occupational status, the identiﬁcation of parameters in (34) relies mainly on the
non-linearity of b ¸1it as a function of zit. This arises from the fact that the vector of explana-
tory variables zit of the multinomial logit model mainly consists of xit (plus second-order
and interaction terms of variables there). It is possible that b ¸1it is highly correlated with
xit. In such a case, multicollinearity will lead to the inﬂation of the parameter estimates’
standard errors. This prevents us from precisely identifying the effects of NHI on labor
market outcomes.
Our identiﬁcation fails when there are omitted variables whose relative effects on pri-
vate sector vs. public sector employees change over time. Potentially, there are two cate-
gories of omitted variables which lead to biased estimates of the difference-in-differences.
The ﬁrst pertains to macroeconomic factors affecting private/public relative work hours and
wage rates. This arises, because private sector and public sector employees’ work hours and
wage rates may respond to economic shocks differently. For example, government employ-
ees’ work hours and wage rates may not be as responsive to changes in economic conditions
or tightness in the labor market as are private employees. To guard against such omitted
variables, we include indicators of the business cycle and labor market tightness (i.e., the
unemployment rate and the composite index of Taiwan’s stock exchange) as regressors and
allow them to determine private sector and public sector employees’ labor market outcomes
differently. In addition, we have chosen our study period carefully to make sure that there
are no institutional/policy changes which may affect the structure of private/public relative
work hours and wage rates.
19Moreover, identiﬁcation fails if we omit individual characteristics which affect one’s NHI
premium rate, e.g., whether or not one’s spouse is employed and the number of children,
etc. Since both the number of children and whether or not one’s spouse is employed are
not observed in our sample, our results may be subject to bias. To control for this cate-
gory of omitted variables, we estimate the difference-in-differences based on a subsample
of single individuals. By so doing the estimated difference-in-difference estimates are not
confounded by marital status and the number of children, which affect an individual’s total
NHI premium rate.
6 Data
To investigate NHI’s impact on the labor market, we use survey data obtained from the
Manpower Utilization Survey (MUS), which is conducted by Taiwan’s Directorate-General
of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics. The MUS is an annual survey conducted in May every
year since 1978. The purpose of the MUS is to collect information on Taiwan’s labor force.
Through the MUS data the government gains an understanding of the current situation in
the labor market. In addition, the government also uses the MUS data for the purposes of
designing and evaluating employment policies and job training programs.
The MUS survey adopts a two-stage random sampling method. In the ﬁrst stage, villages
and communities (called “li” which is a small administrative geographical unit) are drawn.
The drawing of villages and communities in the ﬁrst stage is through stratiﬁed sampling,
where villages and communities are stratiﬁed based on their degree of urbanization, indus-
trial structure, and residents’ educational attainment. In the second stage, households are
drawn from the sampled villages or communities.
All persons aged 15 and over in a sampled household are interviewed. The MUS in-
20terviews members of the sampled households to collect information on these individuals’
demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, relationship to head, etc.), employment sta-
tus, job characteristics (e.g., occupation, industry, and ﬁrm size, etc.), earnings, work hours,
etc.22
To identify NHI’s effect on the labor market, we employ three pre-NHI (i.e., 1992–1994)
cross-sections and two post-NHI (i.e., 1995–1996) cross-sections.23 In order to avoid compli-
cations involving the youth’s labor market entry and the elderly’s retirement, our sample
only includes those who are aged 26–59. We also exclude individuals who face constraints
in labor supply due to health or schooling reasons. We focus on those who are employed
in the private or public sector. Farmers, ﬁshermen, employers, and the self-employed are
excluded from our sample, because their health insurance premiums are determined differ-
ently. Finally, employees working less than 20 hours per week are also deleted from our
sample. This is due to the fact that goverment employees are all full-time employees and in
the pre-NHI era Labor Insurance covered full-time employees only. Thus, the exclusion of
part-time employees makes our sample more homogeneous across time and sectors.
After our sample selection, our full sample consists of 78,628 respondents. Among these
sample respondents, 19.69% (15,481) are government employees and 80.31% (63,147) are
private-sector employees. Government employees are over-represented in our sample due
to the exclusion of the self-employed and agricultural/ﬁshery workers, which are two large
employment sectors in Taiwan.24
In our empirical analyses we use the full sample along with subsamples stratiﬁed by the
22The MUS collects information on the number of children for female respondents only. Since we have infor-
mation on a respondent’s relationship with the head of a household, but not her relationship with everybody
else in the household, we are not able to identify the spouse of every female respondent. This prevents us from
obtaining information on a male respondent’s number of children except when he is the head of a household.
23The reason why we do not use data beyond the 1996 cross-section is that the coverage of Taiwan’s Labor
Standard Law was extended to several previously uncovered industries in the private sector as of the be-
ginning of 1997. The extension of the Labor Standard Law may have introduced a structural change to the
pattern of labor supply and demand behavior in the affected industries.
24In Taiwan government employees account for only 8% of the civilian labor force.
21respondents’ gender, marital status and quartiles of the wage rate distribution. Descriptive
statistics of the full sample are displayed in Table 2, while those pertaining to the male and
female subsamples are displayed in Table 3. According to Table 2, private sector employees
worked longer hours than their public sector counterparts. In the period 1992–1994, the
average work hours in the private sector were 48.19 per week, and the corresponding ﬁgure
for public-sector employees was 45.81. After 1995, this pattern remained the same. For
private sector employees, the average hours worked decreased by 1.91% to 47.27. Public
sector employees’ average work hours did not change much in the two periods, being 45.81
for the period 1992–1994 and 45.64 for 1995–1996. A comparison of average work hours for
employees in the two sectors indicates that private sector employees have on average have
experienced a relative reduction in the weekly work hours by 0.75.25 These sample means
suggest that, relative to public sector employees, private sector employees experienced a
reduction in work hours.
The full sample means in Table 2 reveal that public sector employees’ average hourly
wage rate (in New Taiwanese Dollars, at 2001 constant dollars) is higher than their private
sector counterparts’. Comparing the average real hourly wage rate for public sector employ-
ees and private sector employees across the periods 1992–1994 and 1995–1996, we ﬁnd that
relative to public sector employees, private sector employees on average have sustained a
decline in the hourly wage rate, i.e., NT$2.11.26 The changes in private/public relative work
hours and wages suggest that the introduction of NHI in Taiwan had a negative effect on the
work hours and real wages of private sector employees relative to public sector employees.
The descriptive statistics by gender are reported in Table 3. Female respondents have
lower work hours and wage rates than the male ones. In Table 3 we ﬁnd a similar pattern
of public/private relative work hour and wage rate changes in both the male and female
25This ﬁgure represents a private vs. public difference-in-difference of average weekly work hours, i.e.,
(47.27¡48.19)¡(45.64¡45.81)Æ¡0.75.
26This ﬁgure represents a private vs. public difference-in-differences, i.e., (176.35¡165.44)¡(233.99¡
220.97)Æ¡2.11
22subsamples as in the full sample. Male employees in the private sector endured a 0.96
hour reduction in work hours and a NT$1.34 cut in the hourly wage rate relative to their
public sector counterparts, while female employees in the private sector endured a 0.40 hour
reduction in work hours and a NT$1.55 cut in the hourly wage rate relative to their public
sector counterparts. These ﬁgures show that male employees in the private sector are more
severely affected by the implementation of NHI than their female counterparts.






























To have a preliminary examination of the effect of Taiwan’s NHI on the labor market,
we look at Figures 1–6.27 Figure 1 shows that the public/private sector inequality in real
wage rates diverges slightly after 1995. The real wage rates in Figure 1 suggest that the
wage rate differentials between public sector and private sector employees are quite stable
over time until 1995. The spread in the average wage rate between public sector employees
27In these ﬁgures we expand the sample period to 1990–1999 in order to have a better idea of The trend
of real wage rates and work hours over time. The data are from the Manpower Utilization Survey, which is
described in Section 6. The ﬁgures draw information from employees who are aged 26–59 and working full
time in the non-agricultural sector.
































































































































and private sector employees started to become slightly larger after 1995. This implies
that private sector employees’ wage rates were growing at a lower rate than their public
sector counterparts. the trends of real wage rates in Figure 2 and Figure 3 indicate that the
divergence in real wage rates is more salient for male employees than for female employees.
Actually, there is no obvious change in the public/private relative real wage rates for female
employees after 1994.
The pattern of work hour differentials between public sector and private sector employ-
ees as exhibited in Figure 4 is similar to that for wage rates. Public sector employees’ av-
erage work hours did not change very much over time during the period 1990–1999, while
those for private sector employees took a dip in 1995. Figures 5 and 6 suggest that the
decline in private sector employees’ relative work hours is more pronounced for male em-
ployees than for female employees.
To sum up, the graphs on real wage rates and work hours demonstrate that NHI has a
26negative effect on private sector employees’ work hours and real wage rates relative to those
of their public sector counterparts. This is especially true for male employees.
In the empirical models, we use a respondent’s gender, marital status, age (and its
square), years of education, number of non-working children in household, and whether
a respondent’s residence is in Northern Taiwan, in Central Taiwan, or in Southern Taiwan
as control variables in our empirical model. In addition, to control for macro-economic con-
ditions in the empirical models, we use the county unemployment rate and the composite
index of the Taiwan Stock Exchange. Descriptive statistics of these variables are exhibited
in Tables 2 and 3.
In the full sample, the demographic characteristics of employees in the two sectors are
slightly different, as reported in Table 2. Public-sector employees on average have more
education. Public sector employees on average have 12.88 and 13.12 years of education for
the 1992–1994 and 1995–1996 periods, respectively, while their private sector counterparts
have an average of 9.87 and 10.36 years of education. The public sector employees are
older. On average a public sector employee is 39.88 and 40.56 years old in the 1992–1994
and 1995–1996 periods, respectively, while an average private sector employee is 36.89 and
37.16 years old. This pattern of sectoral differences in demographic characteristics extends
to the male and female subsamples, as displayed in Table 3.
7 Results
In our empirical investigation we estimate the equations for work hours and wage rates.
Based on the estimation results we obtain estimates of the difference-in-differences and
ratio-of-ratios, which are used to gauge the impact of NHI on private sector employees’
work hours and wage rates. To gain deeper insights into the impact of NHI on work hours
27and wage rates, we stratify our sample into subsamples by gender and marital status. In
addition, we stratify the subsamples of men and women according to whether they have
non-working children, whose presence is likely to affect the NHI’s labor market distortion
because the NHI premiums increase with the number of an employee’s dependents. Since
we have information on a respondent’s children when he/she is the head or spouse of the
household, we restrict the empirical analysis to respondents who are the head or spouse of
the household.28
Moreover, since the impact of NHI on labor supply depends on an employee’s wage rate
and the elasticity of labor supply, which is likely to also depend on the wage rate, we perform
additional estimations by further stratifying each subsample by quartiles of the wage rate
distribution. That is, observations in each subsample are further classiﬁed into four groups
according to their wage rates, namely, (1) having wage rates below the ﬁrst quartile, (2)
having wage rates between the ﬁrst and second quartiles, (3) having wage rates between
the second and third quartiles, and (4) having wage rates above the third quartile. 29
To economize on space, we report only the difference-in-difference and ratio-of-ratios es-
timates. See Tables 5–8. The full set of parameter estimates is available upon request.
While reporting both the endogeneity-corrected and uncorrected results, we rely on the
endogeneity-corrected ones to draw our inference.30 This is because the endogeneity-correction
terms in most cases are statistically signiﬁcant, and in the few cases when they are not, the
differences between the endogeneity-corrected and uncorrected e ¢L and e ¦L¡1 (i.e., estimates
of difference-in-differences and ratio-of-ratios minus one) are not substantial.
28The characteristics of the sample of household heads and their spouses are reported in Table 4.
29In computing the three quartiles, we use the wage rates of all full-time employees. The values of the ﬁrst,
second and third quartiles are $123.88, $167.60, and $220.04, respectively.




We ﬁrst look at the estimation results pertaining to work hours based on the full sam-
ple. According to the endogeneity-corrected estimation results the difference-in-difference
estimate of work hours is e ¢H Æ ¡1.8005. This estimate suggests that a private sector em-
ployee’s work hours decrease by around two hours after the introduction of NHI relative to
public sector counterparts. With the p-value well below the conventional signiﬁcance levels,
the F-statistic (i.e., 34.69) suggests that the difference-in-difference estimate is signiﬁcantly
different from zero. The endogeneity-corrected ratio-of-ratios estimate suggests that, rela-
tive to public sector employees, private sector employees’ work hours decreased by 3.87%,
i.e., e ¦L ¡1 Æ ¡0.0387, which, having an F-statisitic of 32.40, is statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional signiﬁcance levels. These results suggest that NHI’s implementation is likely
to have an impact on private sector employees’ work hours.
Stratiﬁcation by Gender and Marital Status
Now we turn to the estimation results pertaining to the male subsamples, which are
stratiﬁed by marital status. According to the results reported in Table 6,
with
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e ¢H Æ¡2.2588, e ¦H ¡1Æ¡4.66%
ª
for married
and single men, respectively, NHI has a statistically signiﬁcant negative impact on the work
hours of these two groups of male employees in the private sector. This negative impact is
slightly larger for married employees than for the single ones. The larger impact of NHI on
married employees may arise from the additional premiums that they and their employers
have to pay for the dependents.
When we further stratify the subsamples of married and single men by the wage rate
quartiles we ﬁnd that for single men in the private sector, NHI has a statistically signiﬁcant
29work hour impact only for those whose wage rates are between the ﬁrst and second quartiles




e ¢H Æ¡3.5662, e ¦H ¡1Æ¡7.23%
ª
,as reported in Table 8
¢
.
The impact of NHI on married men’s work hours is statistically signiﬁcant in all wage
rate strata. NHI’s negative work hour impact is greater for married men with lower wage





. These estimates increase to
©
e ¢H Æ¡4.8373, e ¦H ¡1Æ¡9.03%
ª
for those
with wage rates below the ﬁrst quartile. This pattern of a decreasing NHI work hour impact
may be produced by a decrease in labor supply elasticity with the wage rate. If labor supply
elasticity decreases with the wage rates, for employees with a higher wage rate, their hours
of labor supply will be less sensitive to a change in the wage rate than in the case of those
who have a lower wage rate.
The results pertaining to female employees in Table 6 exhibit a different response of
work hours to NHI’s implementation. The work hours of the private sector’s female employ-
ees does not seem to be affected by the disincentive effect of NHI’s premiums. This is true
for married as well as for single women. For both groups of women neither the difference-in-
difference estimates nor the ratio-of-ratios estimates are indicative of a statistically signiﬁ-
cant wage rate impact. Our estimation results with stratiﬁcation of the women subsamples
based on wage rate quartiles reveal that NHI does not have any statistically signiﬁcant im-
pact on the work hours of single as well as married women in the private sector (see the
estimation results in Table 8).
In short, we ﬁnd from the gender/marital status stratiﬁed results that married men in
the private sector bear the brunt of the disincentive effect of NHI’s premiums. This ﬁnding
implies that the dependents’ NHI premiums are likely to be paid by the male breadwinner
of a household. We speculate that the resilience of female employees’ work hours is due to
employer discrimination such that employers are unwilling to pay for the NHI premiums of
their female employees’ dependents.
30Stratiﬁcation by Gender and the Presence of Non-Working Children
Based on a sample of household heads and the heads’ spouses, we investigate the varia-
tion in NHI’s impact on work hours with the presence of non-working children.31 According
to the results in Table 7, the presence of non-working children substantially elevates the
negative impact of NHI on private sector married men’s work hours. For married men
without non-working children in the household, we have
©
e ¢H Æ¡2.1219, e ¦H ¡1Æ¡4.38%
ª
,
which are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. The corresponding ﬁgures for those
with non-working children in the household are
©
e ¢H Æ¡2.5574, e ¦H ¡1Æ¡5.25%
ª
, which
are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. These estimates constitute another piece
of evidence supporting our conjecture that the negative effect of NHI on work hours mainly
arises from the disincentive effect of dependents’ NHI premiums.
Table 8 reports the estimation results when we further stratify the male and female sub-
samples by quartiles of the wage rate distribution. We ﬁnd that the non-working children’s
elevation of NHI’s negative work hour impact is more serious for married men in the lower
quartiles of the wage rate distribution. The presence of children in the household does not
have any effect on NHI’s work hour impact for married men with wage rates in other wage
rate ranges. The NHI impacts are statistically insigniﬁcant for these groups of married
men.
The estimates in Table 8 indicate that the presence of non-working children in the house-
hold does not have any statistically signiﬁcant impact on the work hours of married women
in the private sector. We conjecture that this ﬁnding arises because the NHI premiums
of dependents in a household are mostly paid by the male breadwinner such that the work
hours of the household’s married female workers are not much affected. Moreover, the strat-
iﬁcation of the married women’s subsamples by quartiles of the wage rates reveals that the
31The reason why our estimation is restricted to household heads and their spouses is that we have infor-
mation about the number of children only for this group of respondents in the MUS data.
31presence of non-working children aggravates the NHI work hour impact on married women
whose wage rates are above the third quartile.
The ﬁnding from the stratiﬁcation of the married men’s and married women’s subsam-
ples by the presence of non-working children suggests that the presence of non-working
children in the household has a signiﬁcant effect on the impact NHI’s work hours on both
married men and married women.
7.2 Wage Rates
Full Sample Results
According to the full sample results in Table 5, private sector employees have sus-
tained a trivial reduction in their wage rate relative to their public sector counterparts,
i.e., e ¢W Æ¡$2.5192 and e ¦W ¡1Æ¡1.99%, which, nevertheless, are statistically insigniﬁcant
at conventional levels, according to the endogeneity-corrected estimation results. Our ﬁnd-
ing concerning the wage rate impact of NHI suggests that neither private sector employers
nor their employees are able to shift their premium burden to each other.
Stratiﬁcation by Gender and Marital Status
According to Table 6, the effect of NHI on the wage rates is still statistically insigniﬁcant
when we stratify the male and female subsamples by gender and marital status. There are
not very signiﬁcant changes in the results for single men and women and married women
when we further stratify the subsamples by quartiles of the wage rates distribution, as





for those having wage rates between the ﬁrst and second quartiles of





for married women having wage rates between the ﬁrst and second quar-
32tiles. The results suggest that NHI’s implementation does not have any wage impact on
single women in any of the wage categories.
With stratiﬁcation by quartiles of wage rates, we discover in Table 8 that NHI has some
salient impacts on private sector married men’s wage rates. For the private sector’s married
men, whose wage rates are above the third quartile or between the second and third quar-











with the implementation of NHI, while those having wage rates below
the ﬁrst quartile experience an increase in wage rates
¡©
e ¢W Æ$4.7867, e ¦W ¡1Æ4.57%
ª¢
rel-
ative to their public sector counterparts.32 Table 8’s results show that the wage rate impact
of NHI is a negative function of wage rates. For private sector married men with wage rates
above the third quartile, NHI’s negative wage rate impact is the largest. The negative wage
rate impact becomes smaller for those having a rate wage between the second and third
quartiles. NHI’s wage rate impact eventually becomes positive for employees below the ﬁrst
quartile of the wage rate distribution.
The patterns of NHI’s wage rate effect and work hour effect (i.e., the negative work
hour effect decreases with wage rates, as discussed above) is consistent with a decreasing
elasticity of labor supply with the wage rate. If the elasticity of labor supply decreases with
the wage rate, according to equations (10) and (11), where g1 decreases with wage rates, we
will see that the negative response of work hours to NHI’s implementation shrinks with the
wage rate; while, according to (8) and (9), the numerical value of NHI’s wage rate impact is
negatively related to the wage rate.
Stratiﬁcation by Gender and the Presence of Non-Working Children
We see from Table 7’s estimates that the stratiﬁcation of the married men’s subsample
32The statistical insigniﬁcance of the effects of NHI’s wage rates without stratiﬁcation by wage rate quartiles
is likely to be due to the fact that the NHI’s wage rate effects are opposite in sign for employees in different
ranges of the wage rate distribution.
33by the presence of children in the household does not make a substantial difference to NHI’s
wage rate effect. Estimates of e ¢W and e ¦W ¡1 remain statistically insigniﬁcant. However,
when we further stratify the subsamples by the wage rate distribution’s quartiles, we see
from the results in Table 8 that some groups bear a greater NHI wage rate impact than
others. For married men without non-working children in the household (whose results
are reported in Table 8), those with wage rates above the third quartile bear a (weak) sta-




e ¢W Æ¡$26.6877, e ¦W ¡1Æ¡7.68%
ª¢
,
while the impact is statistically insigniﬁcant for those having non-working children in the
same wage rate range, as reported in Table 8. For married men with non-working children
and having wage rates between the third and second quartiles, they bear a statistically sig-




e ¢W Æ¡$7.7330, e ¦W ¡1Æ¡3.36%
ª¢
, while the NHI
wage rate impact on their counterparts without non-working children in the same wage
rate range is statistically insigniﬁcant. The NHI wage rate impacts of married men in other
wage rate categories are not affected by the presence of non-working children.
There is no change in NHI’s wage rate impact for married women with or without non-
working children in the household. (See the results in Table 7.) This is also true when
we further stratify married women’s subsamples by wage rate quartiles, whose results are
reported in Table 8.
8 Conclusion
This research investigates the effects of NHI on the labor market based on the case of Tai-
wan, which implemented NHI in 1995. Taiwan’s NHI is ﬁnanced by premiums, which are
proportional to salaries and shared between employers and employees. The medical in-
surance beneﬁts enjoyed by both government employees and private sector employees are
both similar before and after the implementation of NHI, with the exception that private
34sector employees’ dependents were not covered by public insurance. However, the premium
rates charged to private sector employers and employees have increased substantially, while
those charged to public sector employers and employees are almost unchanged. By exploit-
ing these differential changes in the premium rates, we attempt to empirically identify the
NHI’s impact on private sector employees’ work hours and wage rates.
Our empirical work is based on repeated cross-sectional individual data for the years
1992–1996. We measure the impact of NHI on work hours and wage rates by estimating
difference-in-differences and ratio-of-ratios, with public sector employees being the control
group and private sector employees being the treatment group. In addition to setting up a
ﬂexible empirical model, we account for the endogeneity of sectoral choice in our empirical
analyses.
Our ﬁndings are broadly consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model. The
ﬁnancing of NHI through premiums, which are proportional to salaries, injects distortions
in the labor market. There is a non-trivial reduction in the work hours of male employees
in the private sector, relative to their public sector counterparts. The decline in work hours
for married men, but not for married women, suggests that the dependents’ NHI premiums
are mainly borne by a household’s male breadwinner and his employer. We speculate that
this ﬁnding reﬂects discrimination against female employees by private sector employers,
who are not paying the NHI premiums for their female employees’ dependents.
We ﬁnd that NHI’s wage rate impact on married men depends on the employees’ wage
rates. For married men with wage rates above the median wage rate, the impact is negative
and this negative impact increases with their wage rates, while NHI’s wage rate impact
is positive for those with wage rates below the ﬁrst quartile. This pattern of the NHI wage
rate impact for married men is consistent with a negative relationship between labor supply
elasticity and the wage rate. For both married and single women, NHI’s wage rate impact
is not substantial.
35We do not ﬁnd a negative wage impact of NHI on some groups of employees, especially
female employees and male employees with lower wage rates. This indicates that for a given
employee in these groups the incidence of NHI premium fell more on his/her employer, who
contributes a larger share of the total NHI premium.
It is noted that prior to NHI, except for dependents of a public sector employee, individ-
uals had to be employed in order to be covered by public health insurance. Some individ-
uals might have participated in the labor market partly for the reason of obtaining public
health insurance coverage. Thus, Taiwan’s NHI, which covers all citizens regardless of em-
ployment status, may have a negative employment effect. Some individuals, especially the
elderly and married women, who might have been in the labor force mainly for the purpose
of being covered by public health insurance, may withdraw from the labor market after the
introduction of NHI. This issue is not investigated in the current study and will be left for
future research.
An important policy implication derived from our empirical ﬁndings is that ﬁnancing
NHI by premiums tied to salaries may introduce distortions to the labor market. The gov-
ernment may be able to minimize or avoid these distortions by re-designing the premium
scheme. One option to minimize NHI’s labor market distortion is to establish a link between
the amount of premium contribution and the amount of medical beneﬁts that an individual
enjoys, e.g., by means of a medical savings accounts. By doing so, to some extent, the dis-
incentive effects of the NHI premium contribution on labor supply may be offset by the
increase in medical beneﬁts. Another option is to weaken the link between an employee’s
salary and the amount of NHI premium contribution, e.g., by introducing a more discrete
premium contribution schedule, under which an employee and his/her employer contribute
a ﬁxed amount of NHI premium if this employee’s income is within a certain range. These
two options may be implemented simultaneously.
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38Table 1: The Changes in Premium Rates
Pre-NHI Post-NHI Changes
(A) (B) (A+B) (A’) (B’) (A’ÅB’) (A’ ¡A) (B’¡B)
Employers’ Employees’ Total Employers’ Employees’ Total Employers’ Employees’
premium premium premium premium premium premium
rate rate rate rate rate rate
Public Sector
GEI 5.85% 3.15% 9% 3.09% 1.66% 4.75% ¡2.76% ¡1.49%
NHI — — — 2.98% 1.27% 4.25% Å2.98% Å1.27%
GEI+NHI 5.85% 3.15% 9% 6.07% 2.93% 9% Å0.22% ¡0.22%
Private Sector
LI 4.90% 1.40% 6.30% 4.55% 1.30% 5.85% ¡0.35% ¡0.10%
NHI — — — 2.98% 1.27% 4.25% Å2.98% Å1.27%
LI+NHI 4.90% 1.40% 6.30% 7.53% 2.57% 10.10% Å2.63% Å1.17%
39Table 2: Full Sample Descriptive Statistics†
Variable
Public Sector Private Sector
Pre-NHI Post-NHI Pre-NHI Post-NHI
(1992–1994) (1995–1996) (1992–1994) (1995–1996)
Work Hours 45.81 45.64 48.19 47.27
(5.24) (5.26) (6.59) (6.56)
Wage Rate 220.97 233.99 165.44 176.35
(89.22) (88.95) (83.01) (94.96)
Gender (Male=1, Female=0) 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.62
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49)
Marital Status (Married=1, Single=0) 0.82 0.82 0.71 0.69
(0.39) (0.39) (0.46) (0.46)
Age 39.88 40.56 36.89 37.16
(8.83) (8.75) (8.35) (8.27)
Age Squared 16.69 17.21 14.31 14.49
(7.37) (7.32) (6.70) (6.63)
Years of Education 12.88 13.12 9.87 10.36
(3.38) (3.24) (3.74) (3.70)
No. of Non-Working Children in Household 0.61 0.62 0.58 0.54
(1.15) (1.14) (1.19) (1.14)
County Unemployment Rate 1.26 1.77 1.34 2.02
(1.12) (1.47) (1.07) (1.55)
In Northern Taiwan (=1 if Yes; =0 otherwise) 0.43 0.43 0.48 0.47
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
In Central Taiwan (=1 if Yes; =0 otherwise) 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43)
In Southern Taiwan (=1 if Yes; =0 otherwise) 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.24
(0.45) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43)
Index of Taiwan Stock Exchange 4.46 5.89 4.45 5.90
(0.32) (0.35) (0.32) (0.35)
Observations 9,129 6,352 37,071 26,076
†Standard errors in parentheses.
40Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by Gender†
Variable
Male Female
Public Sector Private Sector Public Sector Private Sector
Pre-NHI Post-NHI Pre-NHI Post-NHI Pre-NHI Post-NHI Pre-NHI Post-NHI
(1992–1994) (1995–1996) (1992–1994) (1995–1996) (1992–1994) (1995–1996) (1992–1994) (1995–1996)
Work Hours 46.52 46.37 48.78 47.67 44.53 44.40 47.16 46.63
(5.94) (6.03) (6.27) (6.33) (3.27) (3.23) (7.02) (6.88)
Wage Rates 232.92 246.47 190.40 202.61 199.23 212.68 121.56 133.46
(91.12) (92.11) (84.01) (100.57) (81.26) (78.85) (59.82) (65.28)
Marital Status (Married=1, Single=0) 0.86 0.85 0.71 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.71 0.69
(0.35) (0.36) (0.46) (0.46) (0.44) (0.43) (0.45) (0.46)
Age 40.95 41.54 37.13 37.25 37.94 38.88 36.48 37.00
(8.99) (8.75) (8.54) (8.38) (8.17) (8.49) (7.98) (8.10)
Age Squared 17.58 18.02 14.51 14.58 15.07 15.83 13.94 14.34
(7.62) (7.43) (6.91) (6.75) (6.61) (6.93) (6.30) (6.42)
Years of Education 12.67 12.90 10.11 10.61 13.25 13.50 9.44 9.95
(3.38) (3.29) (3.60) (3.51) (3.34) (3.10) (3.94) (3.95)
No. of Non-Working Children in Household 0.66 0.64 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.59 0.57 0.53
(1.22) (1.18) (1.20) (1.16) (1.02) (1.07) (1.17) (1.11)
County Unemployment Rate 1.54 2.17 1.63 2.47 0.75 1.09 0.84 1.27
(1.17) (1.43) (1.07) (1.48) (0.80) (1.27) (0.86) (1.38)
In Northern Taiwan (=1 if Yes; =0 otherwise) 0.41 0.41 0.46 0.44 0.47 0.46 0.51 0.51
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
In Central Taiwan (=1 if Yes; =0 otherwise) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.23
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.42) (0.43) (0.42) (0.42)
In Southern Taiwan (=1 if Yes; =0 otherwise) 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.23
(0.45) (0.44) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.41) (0.42) (0.42)
Index of Taiwan Stock Exchange 4.46 5.90 4.46 5.91 4.46 5.89 4.45 5.90
(0.32) (0.35) (0.32) (0.35) (0.32) (0.35) (0.32) (0.35)
Observations 5,892 4,007 23,630 16,175 3,237 2,345 13,441 9,901
†Standard errors in parentheses.
41Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample of Household Heads and Their Spouses†
Variable
Male Female
Public Sector Private Sector Public Sector Private Sector
Pre-NHI Post-NHI Pre-NHI Post-NHI Pre-NHI Post-NHI Pre-NHI Post-NHI
(1992–1994) (1995–1996) (1992–1994) (1995–1996) (1992–1994) (1995–1996) (1992–1994) (1995–1996)
Work Hours 46.46 46.34 48.84 47.71 44.50 44.28 46.82 46.24
(6.05) (6.03) (6.62) (6.81) (3.24) (3.36) (7.60) (7.33)
Wage Rates 244.73 257.32 205.95 222.43 208.80 223.52 117.79 129.32
(98.62) (93.30) (96.45) (119.26) (90.63) (82.48) (63.42) (68.29)
Age 43.62 44.22 41.31 41.76 40.17 41.38 39.12 39.92
(8.22) (7.75) (8.03) (7.81) (7.48) (7.60) (7.58) (7.51)
Age Squared 19.71 20.15 17.71 18.05 16.69 17.70 15.88 16.50
(7.28) (6.91) (6.89) (6.73) (6.30) (6.47) (6.22) (6.22)
Years of Education 12.53 12.77 9.52 10.06 13.06 13.27 8.49 8.91
(3.54) (3.43) (3.82) (3.79) (3.42) (3.19) (3.91) (3.96)
No. of Non-Working Children in Household 2.60 2.54 2.65 2.60 2.24 2.32 2.76 2.72
(1.44) (1.38) (1.50) (1.51) (1.17) (1.24) (1.45) (1.48)
County Unemployment Rate 1.50 1.99 1.45 2.16 0.59 0.82 0.65 0.90
(1.21) (1.32) (1.04) (1.32) (0.68) (1.01) (0.73) (1.11)
In Northern Taiwan (=1 if Yes; =0 otherwise) 0.43 0.44 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.53
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
In Central Taiwan (=1 if Yes; =0 otherwise) 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.21
(0.42) (0.43) (0.42) (0.42) (0.41) (0.43) (0.41) (0.41)
In Southern Taiwan (=1 if Yes; =0 otherwise) 0.29 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.24
(0.45) (0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.43) (0.41) (0.42) (0.42)
Index of Taiwan Stock Exchange 4.47 5.90 4.46 5.91 4.46 5.89 4.45 5.90
(0.32) (0.35) (0.32) (0.35) (0.32) (0.35) (0.32) (0.35)
Observations 4,062 2,728 11,495 7,715 1,987 1,652 7,399 5,287
†Standard errors in parentheses.
42Table 5: Full Sample Results
Corrected for Endogeneity Not Corrected for Endogeneity
NHI’s Impact
Work Hours Wage Rate Work Hours Wage Rate
e ¢L -1.8005 -2.5192 -1.7031 -1.4005
e ¿¢
L 34.69¤¤¤ 0.35 31.10¤¤¤ 0.10
[0.00]† [0.56] [0.00] [0.76]
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0387 -0.0199 -0.0365 -0.0051
e ¿¦
L 32.40¤¤¤ 0.57 28.95¤¤¤ 0.04
[0.00] [0.45] [0.00] [0.85]
b µ1it -0.1328¤¤¤ 0.2885¤¤¤ —– —–
(-14.51)‡ (8.32)
b µ0it -0.0402¤¤¤ -0.2635¤¤¤ —– —–
(-4.04) (-6.99)
†p-value in square parentheses.
‡t-statistic in parentheses.
¤¤¤Signiﬁcant at 1% level. ¤¤Signiﬁcant at 5% level. ¤Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
e ¢L stands for the difference-in-difference estimate evaluated at the sample means.
e ¦L stands for the ratio-in-ratios estimate evaluated at the sample means.
e ¿¢
L stands for the F-statistic of the difference-in-difference estimate e ¢L.
e ¿¦
L stands for the F-statistic of the ratio-in-ratios estimate e ¦L.
b µjit stands for the endogeneity correction term.
43Table 6: Results by Gender and Marital Status
Corrected for Endogeneity Not Corrected for Endogeneity
Subsample NHI’s Impact
Work Hours Wage Rate Work Hours Wage Rate
e ¢L -2.2588 0.4881 -2.3996 -4.2678
e ¿¢
L 6.00¤¤ 0.01 6.98¤¤¤ 0.25
[0.01]† [0.90] [0.01] [0.62]
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0466 0.0026 -0.0495 -0.0237
Single e ¿¦
L 6.19¤¤ 0.01 7.26¤¤¤ 0.24
[0.01] [0.90] [0.01] [0.62]
b µ1it 0.0236 0.2333¤¤¤ —– —–
(0.91)‡ (3.54)
b µ0it 0.0454 0.3965¤¤¤ —– —–
Male
(0.98) (3.35)
e ¢L -2.6253 2.2070 -2.6126 1.7382
e ¿¢
L 40.10¤¤¤ 0.20 39.41¤¤¤ 0.05
[0.00] [0.66] [0.00] [0.82]
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0540 0.0128 -0.0537 0.0089
Married e ¿¦
L 42.04¤¤¤ 0.29 41.41¤¤¤ 0.05
[0.00] [0.59] [0.00] [0.82]
b µ1it -0.0081 -0.0820¤¤ —– —–
(-0.51) (-2.07)
b µ0it -0.0358¤ 0.1895¤¤¤ —– —–
(-1.70) (3.61)
e ¢L -0.8892 -4.0320 -1.1070 0.0755
e ¿¢
L 1.00 0.27 1.64 0.01
[0.32] [0.60] [0.20] [0.90]
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0191 -0.0292 -0.0249 0.0011
Single e ¿¦
L 0.98 0.13 1.65 0.04
[0.32] [0.72] [0.20] [0.84]
b µ1it -0.0935¤¤¤ 0.5956¤¤¤ —– —–
(-5.27) (12.27)
b µ0it 0.0356 -0.2170¤¤¤ —– —–
Female
(1.29) (-2.88)
e ¢L -0.3032 -1.5429 -0.1071 -0.1653
e ¿¢
L 0.19 0.07 0.03 0.05
[0.66] [0.80] [0.85] [0.81]
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0063 -0.0187 -0.0021 -0.0024
Married e ¿¦
L 0.16 0.12 0.03 0.01
[0.69] [0.73] [0.87] [0.94]
b µ1it -0.1229¤¤¤ 0.5212¤¤¤ —– —–
(-8.98) (6.98)
b µ0it -0.0106 -0.2928¤¤ —– —–
(-0.45) (-2.29)
†p-value in square parentheses.
‡t-statistic in parentheses.
¤¤¤Signiﬁcant at 1% level. ¤¤Signiﬁcant at 5% level. ¤Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
e ¢L stands for the difference-in-difference estimate evaluated at the sample means.
e ¦L stands for the ratio-in-ratios estimate evaluated at the sample means.
e ¿¢
L stands for the F-statistic of the difference-in-difference estimate e ¢L.
e ¿¦
L stands for the F-statistic of the ratio-in-ratios estimate e ¦L.
b µjit stands for the endogeneity correction term.
44Table 7: Results for Household Heads and Their Spouses by Gender and the Presence of
Non-Working Children — Sample of Household Heads and Their Spouses
Corrected for Endogeneity Not Corrected for Endogeneity
Subsample NHI’s Impact
Work Hours Wage Rate Work Hours Wage Rate
e ¢L -2.1219 -4.0529 -2.1331 -1.1553
e ¿¢
L 8.30¤¤¤ 0.26 8.70¤¤¤ 0.02
[0.00]† [0.61] [0.00] [0.89]
Married Males without
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0438 -0.0172 -0.0442 -0.0054
Nonworking Children e ¿¦
L 8.51¤¤¤ 0.20 8.82¤¤¤ 0.02
[0.00] [0.65] [0.00] [0.89]
b µ1it -0.0215 0.2287¤¤¤ —– —–
(-0.68)‡ (2.90)
b µ0it 0.0595 -0.0983 —– —–
Male
(1.42) (-0.94)
e ¢L -2.5574 2.4541 -2.5292 -2.6934
e ¿¢
L 14.40¤¤¤ 0.11 14.04¤¤¤ 0.14
[0.00] [0.75] [0.00] [0.71]
Married Males with
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0525 0.0107 -0.0518 -0.0135
Nonworking Children e ¿¦
L 15.20¤¤¤ 0.09 14.84¤¤¤ 0.15
[0.00] [0.76] [0.00] [0.70]
b µ1it 0.0246 -0.6649¤¤¤ —– —–
(0.96) (-10.60)
b µ0it -0.0219 0.2150¤¤¤ —– —–
(0.82) (3.29)
e ¢L -1.3601 -4.8969 -1.0037 -3.1785
e ¿¢
L 1.22 0.28 0.71 0.14
[0.27] [0.59] [0.40] [0.71]
Married Females without
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0282 -0.0172 -0.0212 -0.0143
Nonworking Children e ¿¦
L 1.15 0.00 0.67 0.41
[0.28] [0.97] [0.41] [0.52]
b µ1it -0.0966¤¤¤ 0.4406¤¤¤ —– —–
(-3.82) (7.11)
b µ0it -0.0106 -0.4235¤¤¤ —– —–
Female
(-0.27) (-4.39)
e ¢L 1.3359 0.8183 1.4003 0.5181
e ¿¢
L 1.95 0.00 2.24 0.08
[0.16] [0.97] [0.13] [0.78]
Married Females with
e ¦L ¡1 0.0296 0.0051 0.0313 0.0047
Nonworking Children e ¿¦
L 1.81 0.11 2.10 0.01
[0.18] [0.74] [0.15] [0.92]
b µ1it -0.1563¤¤¤ 0.8100¤¤¤ —– —–
(-6.53) (4.55)
b µ0it -0.0063 -0.3409 —– —–
(-0.17) (-1.24)
†p-value in square parentheses.
‡t-statistic in parentheses.
¤¤¤Signiﬁcant at 1% level. ¤¤Signiﬁcant at 5% level. ¤Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
e ¢L stands for the difference-in-difference estimate evaluated at the sample means.
e ¦L stands for the ratio-in-ratios estimate evaluated at the sample means.
e ¿¢
L stands for the F-statistic of the difference-in-difference estimate e ¢L.
e ¿¦
L stands for the F-statistic of the ratio-in-ratios estimate e ¦L.
b µjit stands for the endogeneity correction term.
45Table 8: Endogeneity Corrected Estimation Results by Wage Rate Quartiles
Male Female
Quartile NHI’s Impact
Work Hours Wage Rate Work Hours Wage Rate
Above the 3rd
e ¢L -1.2852 4.4449 -1.9187 2.8398
[ 0.55]† [0.37] [0.11] [0.42]
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0292 0.0142 -0.0419 0.0104
[0.53] [0.38] [0.10] [0.42]
Between the 3rd and 2nd
e ¢L -1.9810 -7.9973 -0.4191 -9.1782
[0.17] [0.61] [0.76] [0.61]
Single
e ¦L ¡1 - 0.0423 -0.0486 -0.0096 -0.0785
[0.15] [0.61] [0.75] [0.59]
Between the 2rd and 1st
e ¢L -3.5662¤¤ 2.6393¤¤¤ 1.0462 4.0494
[ 0.04] [0.00] [0.65] [0.32]
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0723¤¤ 0.0223¤¤¤ 0.0231 0.0381
[0.03] [0.00] [0.65] [0.32]
Below the 1st
e ¢L - 3.3084 1.5549 -13.8569 1.8693
[0.25] [0.74] [0.65] [0.37]
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0662 0.0127 -0.2310 0.0268
[ 0.23] [0.75] [0.65] [0.46]
Above the 3rd
e ¢L -1.7795¤¤ -4.5751¤¤ -0.6350 -3.3112
[0.01] [0.02] [0.46] [0.68]
e ¦L ¡1 - 0.0441¤¤¤ -0.0135¤ -0.0221 -0.0298
[0.00] [0.05] [0.21] [ 0.94]
Between the 3rd and 2nd
e ¢L -1.2279 -2.6870¤¤¤ -0.7308 -9.0195
[ 0.11] [0.00] [0.57] [0.74]
Married
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0290¤ -0.0160¤¤¤ -0.0140 -0.0905
[0.05] [0.00] [0.59] [0.62]
Between the 2rd and 1st
e ¢L -3.8388¤¤¤ 6.0166 -0.4463 1.3082¤¤
[0.00] [0.34] [0.85] [0.03]
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0838¤¤¤ 0.0528 -0.0040 0.0171¤¤
[ 0.00] [0.12] [0.92] [0.01]
below the 1st
e ¢L -4.8373¤¤ 4.7867 2.0617 5.3334
[0.01] [0.10] [0.62] [0.70]
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0903¤¤¤ 0.0457¤ 0.0118 0.0633
[0.00] [0.06] [0.89] [0.95]
Above the 3rd
e ¢L -1.5428 -26.6877¤ -2.5908 -16.9062
[ 0.17] [0.06] [0.15] [0.30]
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0326 -0.0768¤ -0.0546 -0.0578
[0.16] [0.05] [0.15] [0.35]
Between the 3rd and 2nd
e ¢L -2.0971 3.4449 1.2034 -7.2925
[0.11] [0.37] [0.62] [0.19]
Married without
e ¦L ¡1 - 0.0451 0.0156 0.0264 -0.0461
[0.10] [0.37] [0.63] [0.18]
Non-working Children
Between the 2rd and 1st
e ¢L -3.2913¤ 1.1750 -1.7694 2.6248
[0.05] [0.74] [0.59] [0.62]
e ¦L ¡1 - 0.0666¤¤ 0.0068 -0.0370 0.0237
[0.04] [0.74] [0.59] [0.63]
Below the 1st
e ¢L -1.4661 -11.0223 0.1432 -5.6023
[ 0.57] [0.25] [0.97] [0.74]
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0290 -0.0830 0.0042 -0.0703
[0.57] [0.21] [0.97] [0.72]
Above the 3rd
e ¢L -1.3327 - 21.5260 -2.2659¤ 3.4241
[0.20] [0.12] [0.08] [0.77]
e ¦L ¡1 - 0.0295 -0.0612 -0.0475¤ 0.0208
[0.19] [0.11] [0.07] [0.68]
Between the 3rd and 2nd
e ¢L -1.1196 -7.7330¤¤ 1.7238 -5.1222
[ 0.29] [0.02] [0.23] [0.23]
Married with
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0237 -0.0336¤¤ 0.0392 -0.0316
[0.28] [0.02] [0.24] [0.23]
Non-working Children
Between the 2rd and 1st
e ¢L - 6.5700¤¤¤ 3.1189 2.8758 -4.0182
[0.00] [0.28] [0.24] [0.37]
e ¦L ¡1 -0.1279¤¤¤ 0.0180 0.0673 -0.0343
[ 0.00] [0.28] [0.27] [0.35]
Below the 1st
e ¢L -3.7857 -0.2102 1.6120 6.9953
[0.14] [0.98] [0.82] [0.72]
e ¦L ¡1 -0.0705 - 0.0011 0.0342 0.0718
[0.12] [0.99] [0.84] [0.95]
† p-value of test statistics e ¿¢
L or e ¿¦
L in square parentheses.
¤¤¤Signiﬁcant at 1% level. ¤¤Signiﬁcant at 5% level. ¤Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
e ¢L stands for the difference-in-difference estimate evaluated at the sample means.
e ¦L stands for the ratio-in-ratios estimate evaluated at the sample means.
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